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Blindsight: the capability of some individuals with visual cortical damage to
perform visually guided behaviours even though they report the absence of
any associated conscious content [4].
Conscious content: the continually changing phenomenal content (e.g. ‘qualia’
such as redness and warmth) and intentional content (e.g. explicitly held beliefs,
conscious knowledge) that is present to varying degrees at non-zero conscious
levels.
Conscious level: applies to a whole organism and refers to a scale ranging from
total unconsciousness (e.g. death and coma) to vivid wakefulness. A
‘conscious organism’ is one that is capable of having non-zero conscious
levels. An organism that is dreaming has some conscious level, although the
conscious level is reduced in dreamless sleep. A non-zero conscious level
indicates the presence of some conscious content.
Primary consciousness: conscious content consisting of a multimodal scene
composed of basic perceptual and motor events. Primary consciousness is
sometimes called ‘sensory consciousness’. By contrast, higher-order conscious-
ness refers to awareness of being in a mental state. In humans it is usually
associated with language and an explicit sense of selfhood. In higher-order
theories it is possible to have higher-order thoughts that are not themselves
(higher-order) conscious, but in virtue of which other (primary) contents are
conscious.
Steady-state visual–evoked potential: stimulus-induced components of brain
signals that can be identified over extended periods of time. For example aThe resurgent science of consciousness has been accom-
panied by a recent emphasis on the problem of measure-
ment. Having dependable measures of consciousness is
essential both for mapping experimental evidence to
theory and for designing perspicuous experiments. Here,
we review a series of behavioural and brain-based
measures, assessing their ability to track graded con-
sciousness and clarifying how they relate to each other
by showing what theories are presupposed by each. We
identify possible and actual conflicts among measures
that can stimulate new experiments, and we conclude
that measures must prove themselves by iteratively
building knowledge in the context of theoretical frame-
works. Advances in measuring consciousness have
implications for basic cognitive neuroscience, for com-
parative studies of consciousness and for clinical appli-
cations.
The problem of measurement
How can we measure whether and to what extent a
particular sensory, motor or cognitive event is consciously
experienced? Such measurements provide the essential
data on which the current and future science of conscious-
ness depends, yet there is little consensus on how they
should be made. The problem of measuring consciousness
differs from the problem of identifying unconscious proces-
sing. For instance, in subliminal perception experiments it
is desirable to know whether or not a stimulus has been
consciously perceived, and in implicit learning paradigms
it is interesting to knowwhether the relationships between
different consciously represented stimuli are uncon-
sciously inferred. Measuring consciousness, however,
requires saying something about conscious level (Glossary)
and conscious content beyond the zero-point of uncon-
sciousness.
Here, we review current approaches for measuring
consciousness, covering both behavioural measures and
measures based on neurophysiological data. We outline
a variety of broad theoretical positions before describing a
range of measures in the context of these theories, empha-Corresponding author: Seth, A.K. (a.k.seth@sussex.ac.uk).
314 1364-6613 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rightssizing recent contributions. We find that potential and
actual conflicts among measures suggest new experiments
(Table 1); we also assess how different measures can track
the graded nature of conscious experience (Table 2). We
conclude that it is only by behaving sensibly in a theoreti-
cal context that proposed measures pick themselves up by
their bootstraps, both validating themselves as measures
of what they say they measure and the theories involved.
Theories of consciousness
Worldly discrimination theory
Perhaps the simplest theory that still impacts the exper-
imental literature is that any mental state that can
express its content in behaviour is conscious; thus, a
person shows they are consciously aware of a feature in
the world when they can discriminate it with choice beha-
viour [1,2]. This theory oftenmakes use of signal-detection
theory (SDT), a statistical framework for quantifying the
discriminability of a stimulus [3]. SDT itself is mute on the
subject of consciousness and can, thus, be combined withvisual image flickering at 10 Hz will evoke a response at 10 Hz in the EEG or
magnetoencephalography signal, readily identifiable by a Fourier transform.
reserved. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.04.008 Available online 5 July 2008
Table 1. Conflicts between measuresa
Content unconscious according to:
Objective Strategic control Subjective Wagering
Content
conscious
according
to:
Objective Unconscious knowledge by
Jacoby’s process dissociation
procedure is ipso facto
conscious by objective
measures (e.g. Refs [60,72])
In both subliminal perception
and implicit learning, subjects
often pass objective tasks while
claiming to have no knowledge
or showing no relation between
confidence and accuracy (e.g.
[22,73–75])
Shown in blindsight and
in the Iowa gambling task
by [34]
Strategic
control
Not possible Subjects can control which
grammar to employ while
claiming to be guessing [32] and
hypnotized subjects can engage
in strategic control while
reporting no awareness [76]
Not yet shown but
entirely possible (see
below)
Subjective Not possible Shown in Stroop effects – a
person can report the word’s
meaning but cannot control
its rapid use
As yet only shown in our
unpublished work – a
person can report
awareness but still wager
indiscriminately
Wagering Not possible Not yet shown but entirely
possible (see Box 2)
Not yet shown but entirely
possible (see Box 2)
Widespread
activation
Cognitive control
system, including
prefrontal cortex,
activated by objectively
invisible stimuli [56]
Likely for Stroop with clearly
shown words [44]
Shown in a ‘relative blindsight’
paradigm [31]
Likely given the results
with verbal subjective
measures, but not yet
tested
Synchrony g synchrony persists
during non-REM sleep
and under anaesthesia
[53]
As left As left, also, similar levels of g
synchrony are observed during
non-REM and during (reportable)
REM sleep [52]
As left
Complexity
measures
Possible in theory (but
see F). Not tested in
practice
As left As left As left
Content unconscious according to:
Widespread activation Synchrony Complexity measures
Content
conscious
according
to:
Objective Local neuronal activity can
support discriminatory
behaviour in many non-
conscious organisms (e.g.
nematodes and worms). In
humans, at least sensory and
motor cortices need to be active
Unlikely given current
evidence
Not yet tested but entirely possible
Strategic control Unlikely: strategic control
probably requires activation in
both perceptual and frontal
regions
As above Possible but not tested
Subjective As above As above As above
Wagering As above As above As above
Widespread
activation
Experimentally open. Some
studies show increased long-
range synchrony
accompanying conscious
access [48]
Possible in theory. Not tested
in practice
Synchrony Gamma synchrony is often
localized [47]
As above
Complexity
measures
High neural complexity (or F,
or cd) probably requires
widespread activity: all
else being equal, larger
networks will give rise
to higher complexity
values [17]
Possible in theory. Not tested
in practice
aRows indicate a measure finds the content conscious and columns indicate the measure finds the content unconscious. Entries reflect a scale according to which a particular
conflict is (i) experimentally noted, (ii) not yet shown but entirely possible, (iii) experimentally open, (iv) possible but not tested, (v) unlikely given current evidence and/or
theory, or (vi) not possible.
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.12 No.8different theories. The combination of SDT with the
worldly discrimination theory (WDT) asserts that continu-
ous information available for discriminations is necess-
arily the content of conscious mental states. This theory
captures one property of conscious knowledge, namely
that it enables choice behaviour. However, rightly or
wrongly, it does not respect other properties that are
associated with consciousness. For example, according
to this theory blindsight patients see consciously because
forced-choice discrimination is the result bywhichwe inferthat they can see at all. However, two properties of
blindsight indicate intuitively that the seeing is not
conscious [4]. First, blindsight patients do not spon-
taneously attempt to use the information practically or
inferentially. Second, blindsight patients themselves
think they cannot see.
Integration theories
Other theories attempt to locate a divide between con-
scious and unconscious processes that respect one or both315
Table 2. Sensitivity to graded consciousnessa
Type Measure Primary theoretical
affiliation
Sensitivity to graded conscious
level
Sensitivity to graded conscious content
Behavioural
Objective Discrimination
behaviour
WDT None (either an organism is
sufficiently conscious to show
choice behaviour, or it is not)
The d0 value in SDT might index graded
consciousness, though typically any
d0 > zero is taken to imply full
consciousness [1]
Objective Strategic control Integration theory None (see above) None so far. Various equations
developed assume that a content
is either clearly conscious or
unconscious (e.g. Ref. [9])
Subjective Introspective report HOT Poor and indirect; poor verbal
coherence might indicate low
conscious level
Introspective reports are explicitly
highly sensitive to conscious content
and can indicate close mismatches
between observed and reported states
Subjective Confidence ratings HOT Poor and indirect; confidence
might diminish with conscious
level
Confidence can indicate degrees of
higher-order belief
Subjective PDW HOT Poor and indirect though various
continuous measures can be used
[35]
Gambling measures can indicate
degrees of higher order belief
(see Box 2)
Objective and
subjective
Glasgow coma scale None High None
Neuropyhsiological
EEG Bispectral index None High None
EEG/MEG Early ERP
(‘awareness
negativity’ [77])
Localized integration
[14,39]
Most ERPs are attenuated by sleep
and low arousal, but yet not
directly tested for awareness
negativity
Some. Early ERPs are delayed for
low-contrast stimuli [77]
EEG/MEG Late ERP (P300) Global Integration [40] P300 can be elicited during sleep
though with different profile [78]
Low. P300 dichotomously characterizes
‘seen’ versus ‘not seen’ trials [40]
General
neuroimaging
Widespread
activation
Integration Imaging of consciousness-
impaired patients can distinguish
different conscious levels [45]
Low. Access to global workspace is
usually considered all-or-none [10]
Synchrony Induced g activity Integration (local
and/or global)
Synchrony is present even in non-
REM sleep [53]
Not tested (to our knowledge)
Synchrony SSVEP (frequency
‘tag’)
Global integration Auditory frequency tag is
modulated by arousal level [79]
Not tested (to our knowledge)
Complexity Neural complexity Integration High (in principle but not yet shown) Low
Complexity Information
integration (F)
Integration High (in principle but not yet shown) Some (in principle F can gauge
conscious contents)
Complexity Causal density Integration High (in principle; shown only in
our own unpublished work)
Possibly revealed by causal interaction
patterns but not yet shown
aConscious level can be graded on a scale from coma to full wakefulness, and conscious contents can also be graded (e.g. fringe consciousness and Ganzfeld experiences).
This table indicates how different measures are able to track graded consciousness, as well as their primary theoretical affiliation.
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.12 No.8of the intuitions just mentioned. According to integration
theories, conscious contents are widely available to many
cognitive and/or neural processes. This core idea has been
expressed in various ways. In philosophy, it has been
described as inferential promiscuity [5], fame in the brain
[6], the unified field theory [7] and global access; in cogni-
tive psychology as broadcast within a global workspace [8]
and in a more constrained way as the process dissociation
framework [9]; and in neuroscience as a neuronal global
workspace [10], a dynamic core [11,12], integrated infor-
mation [13], and, in a more constrained way, as locally
recurrent activity [14] or neuronal synchrony [15,16]. The
neuroscience theories in particular have given rise to
several putative measures that have been used to quantify
simultaneous integration and differentiation in neural
dynamics on the basis that conscious experience is also
simultaneously integrated and differentiated [17]. Accord-
ing to these theories a mental state is conscious if it
provides a sufficiently informative discrimination among
a large repertoire of possible states, in which successful
discrimination requires both differentiation and integ-
ration [11,12].316Higher-order thought theories
According to higher-order thought (HOT) theories, a men-
tal state is conscious when a person is actually aware [18]
or disposed toward being aware [19] of being in that state.
Theories differ according to whether awareness of the
mental state is achieved by perceiving it [20] or thinking
about it [18]. HOT theories differ from WDTs in that it is
the ability of a person to discern their mental state, rather
than the state the world is in, which determines whether a
mental state is conscious. In the context of the SDT, HOT
theories is associated either with the criterion of standard
SDT or with the second level of discrimination – discrimi-
nating not the world (as in the WDT) but the accuracy of
our responses [21].
Because of their differing theoretical affiliations,
measures of consciousness can, and do, conflict with each
other, as detailed in Table 1. Also, measures of conscious-
ness not only should distinguish between conscious and
unconscious processing but also indicate the degree to
which an organism or a mental state is conscious
[22,23]. Sensitivity to graded consciousness is described
in Table 2. All theories described so far, with the exception
Box 1. Structural knowledge and judgment knowledge
Tasks can involve a range of knowledge states, the conscious status
of each can be assessed subjectively. For example, when a person is
exposed to a structured domain (e.g. strings from an artificial
grammar), they learn about the structure (structural knowledge).
Artificial grammar learning might consist of the knowledge that an
‘M’ can start a string, about whole strings that were presented and
so on. In the test phase, the structural knowledge is brought to bear
on a test item to form a new piece of knowledge: the judgment, for
example, that this string is grammatical (judgment knowledge) [58].
Structural knowledge can be unconscious when judgment knowl-
edge is conscious. For example in natural language you can
consciously know whether a sentence in your native tongue is
grammatical or not (conscious judgment knowledge) but have no
idea why you know that. It is important to be clear whether a
measure tests the conscious status of judgment or structural
knowledge. Confidence ratings and wagering measures involve
confidence or wagers on a judgment, therefore the guessing and
zero-correlation criteria in these cases test the conscious status of
judgment knowledge only. Similarly, Jacoby’s process dissociation
procedure measures the conscious status of judgment knowledge
[9]: in implicit learning tasks for example, a person can exclude
effectively because they consciously know that a response satisfies
structural constraints without consciously knowing what those
structural constraints are (e.g. that the response forms part of a
long-distance dependency, of a symmetry and so on) [59,60].
Dienes and Scott [58] introduced a simple subjective way of
measuring the conscious status of structural knowledge: for each
judgment in a test phase, subjects indicated whether their judgment
was based on random guessing, intuition, conscious rules or
memory. Guessing and intuition prima facie indicate unconscious
structural knowledge, and conscious rules and memory indicate
conscious structural knowledge. Dienes [21] argued that structural
knowledge might be the interesting target for implicit learning
research (insofar as it has indicated qualitative differences in
knowledge), and that judgment knowledge might be the interesting
target for perception research.
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ditions for asserting whether a particular mental state is
conscious (conscious content). They do not generally pertain
to whether an organism is conscious or unconscious at a
particular time (conscious level). Aswewill see,measures of
consciousness can, and do, address both of these issues.
Behavioural measures
‘Objective measures’ assume the ability to choose accu-
rately under forced choice conditions as indicating a con-
scious mental state [24,25]. For example being able to pick
which itemmight come next indicates conscious knowledge
of regularities in sequences. Conversely, knowledge is
unconscious if a distinction in the world expresses itself
only in non-intentional characteristics of behaviour (such
as its speed) or in galvanic skin response, functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) or other physiological
characteristics not expressed in behaviour at all [26]. That
is, knowledge is unconscious if it expresses itself in an
indirect – but not a direct – test [27,28]. Unqualified trust
in objective measures presupposes WDT and conflicts with
most other measures (Table 1).
‘Strategic control’ determines the conscious status of
knowledge by the person’s ability to deliberately use or
not use the knowledge according to instructions. In Jaco-
by’s process dissociation procedure [9], a person either tries
to avoid using the information (exclusion task) or makes
sure they do use it (inclusion task); any difference in
influence of the stimulus between these conditions
indicates conscious knowledge, and any use of it despite
intentions in the exclusion condition indicates unconscious
knowledge (e.g. Refs [29,30]). Unqualified trust in this
measure presupposes integration theory.
‘Subjective measures’ require subjects to report their
mental states.Most simply, subjectivemeasures have been
used to ascertain whether a person knows that they know.
The WDT indicates knowledge but not the awareness of
knowing. To test for awareness of knowing, confidence
ratings can be given. If for all the trials when the person
says ‘guess’, the discrimination performance is still above
baseline, then there is evidence that the person has knowl-
edge that they do not know they have: unconscious knowl-
edge by the ‘guessing criterion’ [31]. If a person’s
knowledge states are conscious, they will know when they
know and when they are just guessing. In this case, there
should be a relationship between confidence and accuracy,
indicating conscious knowledge with no relationship indi-
cating unconscious knowledge by the ‘zero-correlation
criterion’ [32,33]. Unqualified trust in subjective measures
presupposes one or other of the higher-order theories.
An advantage of subjective measures is that the con-
scious status of a range of mental states can be assessed,
including both knowledge content and phenomenal content
(Box 1). For example a blindsight patient can consciously
know without consciously seeing – if they think they know
but they do not think they see. Graded degrees of conscious
seeing were assessed by Overgaard et al. [22]: normal sub-
jects consistently reported glimpses or impressions of con-
tent theywere not willing to say they actually saw (Table 2).
Subjective specification of conscious content is often associ-
ated with introspection, but not all subjective reports areintrospective given that introspection requires being con-
sciouslyawareofbeing inamental state (rather thanmerely
being consciously aware of states in the world) [18,22].
Post-decision wagering
Post-decision wagering (PDW) is a recent variation on
confidence ratings whereby subjects make a first-order
discrimination and then place a wager (rather than a
confidence rating) regarding the outcome of the discrimi-
nation [34,35]. As with confidence ratings PDW presup-
poses a version of the HOT theory. Yet, because PDW does
not ask for subjective reports, its proponents claim that it is
a direct and objective measure of consciousness (see Box 2
for arguments against this claim). An advantage is that the
lack of subjective reports enables the method to be used
with children [35] and animals.
Finally, most behavioural measures are aimed at asses-
sing whether particular mental content is conscious, not
whether an organism is conscious. One exception is the
Glasgow coma scale, a set of behavioural tests used to
assess the presence, absence and depth of coma in patients
with brain trauma [36]. In clinical contexts such beha-
vioural tests are increasingly being augmented by brain-
based measures of conscious level.
Brain Measures
Electroencephalegraphic measures
In 1929, HansBerger discovered thatwaking consciousness
is associated with low-amplitude, irregular electroencepha-317
Box 2. Post-decision wagering: a ‘direct’ measure of
awareness?
In PDW, subjects make a first-order discrimination and then place a
wager on its outcome [34]. Unconscious knowledge can be shown
by above-chance first-order discriminations when (i) low wagers are
given (guessing criterion) or (ii) there is no relationship between
wagering and accuracy (zero correlation criterion). In one example
the blindsight subject ‘GY’ classified a sensory stimulus as either
present or absent, and then wagered either a small monetary stake
or a large stake on the correctness of this classification. Although GY
made the correct classification on 70% of trials, he was just as
likely to bet low as he was to bet high on these trials. This absence of
advantageous wagering is taken as evidence for absence of
consciousness of the correctness of the first-order discrimination.
Conversely, good first-order performance accompanied by advanta-
geous wagering is taken as evidence of awareness of the first-order
stimuli. Like confidence ratings, PDW requires the subject to make a
‘metacognitive’ judgment about a (putatively) conscious experience
but it differs by implementing this requirement indirectly, via a
wager. As a result there can be conflicts between wagering and
verbal reports that directly express HOTs (see Table 1 in the main
text). Because wagering might avoid some biases affecting
introspective and confidence reports (e.g. subjects can be reluctant
to report weakly perceived stimuli [22]), PDW has been asserted to
provide a ‘direct and objective’ measure of awareness [34]. This is a
strong claim that is difficult to justify [61–63]:
 All behavioural measures, including PDW, require a response
criterion: for example, whether to push a button or not (therefore
claiming a ‘direct’ behavioural measure might be mistaken from
the outset). Any response criterion can be affected by cognitive
bias, and, for PDW, a plausible bias could arise from risk aversion.
As with confidence methods, the zero correlation criterion can
take account of bias but any trial-to-trial variation in bias will still
undermine its sensitivity.
 Because PDW does not ask for subjective reports, it is difficult to
exclude the possibility that advantageous wagering could be
learned unconsciously. This could be shown by wagering
advantageously (based on unconscious judgment knowledge)
while always believing that one is guessing.
 Because PDW requires a metacognitive judgment about a
putatively conscious experience, it is apparently no more
‘objective’ than a confidence judgment.
PDW highlights the interdependence of measures and theories.
According to HOT theories the metacognitive nature of PDW is not
problematic because some metacognitive content is constitutive of
any conscious state. However, from non-HOT perspectives, the
absence of wagering-related metacognitive content does not by
itself imply the absence of primary (sensory) conscious content.
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.12 No.8lographic (EEG) activity in the 20–70 Hz range. It is now
known that unconscious conditions such as non-REM sleep,
coma, general anaesthesia and epileptic absence seizures
show predominantly low-frequency, regular and high-
amplitude oscillations [37,38]. Event-related cortical poten-
tials (ERPs) have been used to assess whether a stimulus is
consciously perceived ornot, although there is dispute about
whether early (e.g. ‘visual awareness negativity’, 100 ms
[39]) or late (e.g. the ‘P300’, 300 ms [40]) components are
most relevant.ERPsalsoareassociatedwithother functions
beyond consciousness per se, for example in novelty detec-
tion or recognition [41]. The proprietary ‘bispectral index’
(BIS) combines various aspects of the EEG signal to esti-
mate anaesthetic depth (conscious level) and hence the
probability of accidental waking during surgery [42]. EEG
measures either float free of theory, gaining purchase
through reliable correlation (e.g. BIS), or assume a version
of integration theory inwhich the appearance of a particular318ERP indicates global availability [40] or locally recurrent
processing [39] (Table 2).
Widespread activation
In line with integration theories, abundant evidence
indicates that consciously perceived inputs elicit wide-
spread brain activation, as compared with inputs that do
not reach consciousness [43]. For example, Dehaene and
colleagues have shown in a visual masking paradigm that
consciously seen stimuli activate a broad frontoparietal
network compared with unseen stimuli, by using both fMRI
[44] and ERP signals [40]. Neuroimaging of vegetative and
minimally conscious patients also reveals stimulus-evoked
activity only in sensory cortices [45].However, differences in
conscious perception are often confounded with differences
in performance. LauandPassingham [31] controlled for this
confound by using a metacontrast masking paradigm and
found that conscious and unconscious conditions are differ-
entiated only by activity in the left mid-dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex; widespread brain activity was found in both
conditions given sufficiently accurate performance. These
results indicate thatwidespread activation can conflict with
other measures (Table 1), although it is difficult to know
whether the additional prefrontal activity is related to the
generation of conscious content and/or to subjective report of
that content.
Synchrony
Several researchers have suggested that consciousness
arises from transient neuronal synchrony, possibly in
the g (30–70 Hz) [15,16] or b (15 Hz) [46] ranges. Measur-
ing consciousness by synchrony presupposes integration
theories of at least a limited kind (to the extent that local
synchrony is deemed sufficient [14,47]). Several studies
have reported an association between synchrony and con-
sciousness, both in induced g-range activity [47,48] and in
steady-state visual–evoked potentials (SSVEP) (‘frequency
tags’ [49]). However, there is not yet evidence that disrup-
tion of g-band synchrony leads to disruption of conscious
contents [50], and g oscillations have been associated with
a wide range of cognitive functions in addition to conscious-
ness per se [51]. Moreover, g synchrony can be present
equally during REM (consciously vivid) and non-REM
(dreamless) sleep states [52], and also can be high during
anaesthesia [53]. Together these observations indicate
that neuronal synchrony might at best be necessary but
that is not sufficient for consciousness.
Complexity, information integration and causal density
Several recent measures build on the observation that
conscious scenes are distinguished by being simul-
taneously integrated (each conscious scene is experienced
‘all of a piece’) and differentiated (each conscious scene is
composed of many distinguishable components and is
therefore different from every other conscious scene)
[11,13,17] (Box 3). The dynamic core hypothesis (DCH)
proposes that consciousness arises from neural dynamics
in the thalamocortical system with just these features, as
measured by the quantity ‘neural complexity’ (CN).CN is an
information-theoretic measure; theCN value is high if each
subset of a neural system can take onmany different states
Box 3. Consciousness and complexity
Three recently proposed measures – neural complexity CN [54], information integration F [13] and causal density cd [55] – attempt to capture the
coexistence of integration and differentiation that is central to ‘complexity’ theories of consciousness (Figure I). All these measures are defined in
terms of the stationary dynamics of a neural system (X), composed of N elements. CN and F are based on information theory, whereas cd is based
on multivariate autoregressive modelling. The neural complexity CN(X) of X is calculated as the average mutual information (MI; a measure of
statistical dependence) among subsets of all possible sizes for all bipartitions of X. This quantity is high if small subsets of X show high statistical
independence but large subsets show low independence. In view of the computational expense of considering all bipartitions, CN can be
approximated by considering only bipartitions of one element and the remainder of the system; another approximation derives directly from
network topology [64].
Information integration F(X) is defined as the effective information (EI) across the ‘minimum information bipartition’ (MIB) of X, where EI is a
directed version of MI that depends on stimulating one half of a bipartition with random (maximally entropic) activity and where the MIB is that
bipartition for which the normalized EI is minimum, the informational ‘weakest link’ [65]. Whereas CN is a measure of actual neural activity, F is a
measure of the capacity of a system to integrate information. Like CN, F is infeasible to compute for large N. It is also obviously challenging to
inject arbitrary subsets of real biological systems with random activity.
Causal density cd(X) is calculated as the fraction of interactions among X’s elements that are casually significant, as identified by ‘Granger
causality’ [66]. Granger causality is a statistical interpretation of causality in which x1 ‘causes’ x2 if knowing the past of x1 helps predicts the future
of x2 better than knowing the past of x2 alone. It is usually calculated by linear autoregression, although nonlinear extensions exist [67]. High cd
indicates that elements in X are both globally coordinated (to be useful for predicting the activities of others) and dynamically distinct (to
contribute to these predictions in different ways). Like F but not CN, cd is sensitive to causal interactions in neural dynamics. Like CN but not F, it
reflects the activity and not the capacity of X. Like both, it is difficult to calculate for large N.
Figure I. Measuring integration and differentiation in neural dynamics, for a system composed of N elements. (a) CN is calculated as the sum of the average MI over N/2
sets of bipartitions indexed by k (e.g. for k = 1 an average MI is calculated over N bipartitions). (b) F is calculated as the EI across the MIB. To calculate EI for a given
bipartition (indexed by j), one subset is injected with maximally entropic activity (orange stars) and MI across the partition is measured. (c) cd is calculated as the fraction
of interactions that are causally significant according to Granger causality. A weighted (and unbounded) version of cd can be calculated as the summed magnitudes of
all significant causal interactions (depicted by arrow width).
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.12 No.8and if these states make a difference to the rest of the
system [54].
The information integration theory of consciousness
(IITC) shares with the DCH the idea that conscious experi-
ences provide informative discriminations among a vast
repertoire of possible experiences [13]. In the IITC, the
quantity F is defined as the information that is integrated
across the informational ‘weakest link’ of a system. Impor-
tantly, F is a measure of the capacity of a neural system to
integrate information, whereas CN is a measure of the
actual dynamics of the system. A third measure, causal
density (cd), measures the fraction of causal interactions
among elements of a system that are statistically signifi-
cant; it is low both for highly integrated systems and for
collections of independent elements [55].
Unqualified trust in CN, F or cd presupposes an integ-
ration theory. This is particularly explicit forF because theIITC defines consciousness as information integration,
implying that high F in any system, biological or other-
wise, is sufficient for consciousness. Although all three
measures are well grounded in theory, in practice they
are difficult to measure, and their experimental explora-
tion stands as an important challenge.
Measures, theories and conflicts
Theories of consciousness recommend the use of certain
measures, and the use of certain measures presuppose
particular theories. Just as theoretical positions conflict
with one another, conflicts among measures can be
expected and, in many cases, have been observed
(Table 1). These conflicts can guide further experiments
and theoretical refinements. For example the extent to
which PDW corresponds with other behavioural measures
will shed light on whether wagering involves separate319
Box 4. Outstanding questions
 Can the neural mechanisms underlying subjective report be
dissociated from those underlying consciousness per se [14,68]?
 Which possible conflicts between measures indicated in Table 1
(in the main text) can be demonstrated? Which measures cohere
together? Under what conditions do the answers produced by a
measure make theoretical sense?
 How can multiple measures be combined to better isolate the
neural mechanisms of consciousness? Can multiple measures
isolate independent processes underlying conscious experience?
 Do CN, F or cd behave as predicted by theory? Answering this
question depends on (i) experimental methods of sufficient
spatiotemporal resolution to reveal relevant details of thalamo-
cortical activity, and (ii) sensible approximations enabling appli-
cation to large neural datasets.
 Can a theoretically principled objective measure improve on
current clinical methods of diagnosing anaesthesia and impaired
consciousness after brain injury?
 How does a measure of consciousness affect what it supposedly
measures? This question relates to behavioural subjective
methods, especially introspection [69].
 Which measures can be applied to infants and non-human
animals and how should the results be interpreted [70,71]?
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.12 No.8mechanisms of higher-order access, potentially indicating
new aspects of HOT theories. Regarding brain measures,
results indicating the insufficiency of widespread acti-
vation [31,56] and g synchrony [52,53] (when conscious
contents are measured by subjective report) challenge
basic integration theories and indicate that new insights
will be uncovered by comparing these measures with those
based on complexity theory.
The most informative new studies will be those that
combine multiple measures, both behavioural and brain-
based (Box 4). Presently, thesemeasures tend to pick up on
different aspects of consciousness: behavioural measures
aremostly used for assessing which contents are conscious,
whereas at least some brain-based measures seem well
suited for measuring conscious level; graded consciousness
can, in principle, be assessed by either type but in different
ways (Table 2). Therefore, an integrative approach com-
bining both types of measure in a single study encourages a
virtuous circularity in which putative measures and theor-
etical advances mutually inform, validate and refine one
another. The ultimate virtue in ameasure is not it’s a priori
toughness, but its ability to build on intuitions, identify
interesting divides in nature and then correct the founda-
tions on which it was built [57].
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